This session will discuss a working paper by Eric Scorsone and Fabrizio Esposito, The Doctrinal Myth of the Efficient Breach in the Overbid Scenario: Unduly Reducing Expected Performance to Expected Profit.
In a contractual relationship, does the Promisor own the Promisee’s performance? If so, up to what extent? These questions are at the heart of contract law and contract law scholarship. The economic approach to law has long proposed a way to answer these questions, the so-called efficient breach. What do we owe when we break an existing contract to take advantage of a better deal? The authors argue that prominent economic analysis of breach of contract misunderstands the legal, moral, and practical aspects of contractual obligations and entitlements.
This session adds to our series of sessions over the last few years examining the legal complexities of basic economic concepts. The idea of voluntary market transactions for mutual gain is central to the logics of capitalism. Closer attention to how contract law and institutions shape transactions can clarify underlying assumptions and conflicts about who deserves what and why.
Eric Scorsone is Executive Director, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service and Associate Professor of Public Policy by Courtesy, University of Virginia. He co-hosts the Legal-Economic Nexus Podcast with Sarah Klammer.
Fabrizio Esposito is Associate Professor of Private Law, NOVA School of Law and the Research & Development Centre in Law and Society in Lisbon, Portugal.
We’ll begin with a 10 minute introduction by the author, followed by extended conversation with participants.
